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ABSTRACT
This article is concerned with an opening between music and philosophy,  discussing the ideas of Iannis
Xenakis and Jean-Luc Nancy. As early as 1963 Xenakis presented the ﬁrst elements of what  was going to
become  an  extended  study  of  musical  time,  both  in  mathematical  and  phenomenological  terms.  His
compositional  investigation  of  outside-time  structures  intended  to  provide  the  foundations  of  a  General
Harmony, one that allows us to “distinguish structures, architectures, and sound organisms from their temporal
manifestations”. Xenakis drew heavily on the ideas of Parmenides, fascinated by his materialism, and developed
a thinking towards a musical  ontology.  Considering the notion of sound as  materiality,  we can explore the
connection between Xenakis' thinking of temporality and Nancy's study of listening. Both engaged with a quasi-
phenomenology in their questioning and employed independent but similar approaches. Rather than attempting a
dialectical synthesis, this article hopes to allow for some space of resonance for the sensibilities that open up in
the work of the two thinkers.
1. INTRODUCTION
As an “artist-conceptor”, in touch with musical and philosophical tradition, Xenakis engaged at length with
an “unveiling” of the history of music; an unveiling of music and thinking beyond the reasoning of the logico-
technical  apparatus  and  its  applications,  in  the  course  to  capturing  the  force  of  theory,  of  questioning,  of
curiosity; a curiosity that would unveil reason as questioning. This unveiling, Xenakis notes, is to be taken in the
sense expressed by Edmund Husserl in the The Crisis of European Sciences (see Xenakis, 1992, pp. 201 & 377
note  1);  that  is,  instead  of  a  conventional  history  of  music  (and  its  mathematisation),  Xenakis  aimed  to
“reconstruct the train of thought which motivated it” (Husserl, 1970, p. 23). Xenakis' demand for a thinking
beyond the distinction between arts and science, still throws open the possibilities of an artistic praxis whereby
questioning sets the terrain for future scientiﬁc research. His “Philosophy of Music” (published in 1966) was
advanced at a time when his compositional practice was in search of an axiomatisation, whose starting point was
to focus on the experience of sound, and therefore of time and space. In a Parmenidean gesture, Xenakis changed
the  question  of  time  by  advancing  a  denial.  He  dealt  with  the  question  of  time  by  denying  its  perceived
centrality, in a way similar to the Parmenidean denial of the question of change. Contrary to a general consensus
that time in music is everything (for example by Stravinsky or Messiaen [see Xenakis, 1992, p. 192 & Varga,
1996, p. 83]) he interrogated the non temporal, that which is independent of time, that which remains once time
has been removed.1 In a sense, he got around the Heraclitean aphorism that everything flows, invoking the “ﬁrst
and absolute materialism” of Parmenides (Xenakis, 1992, p. 203).
Xenakis advanced his compositional technique in the light of such questioning. His axiomatics often took the
form of an intense critique, and his practice was destined to provide further possibilities, such as his theory of
sieves: his alternative to re-articulating the non temporal. The application of this logico-technical mechanism
though, was not destined to provide any kind of closure of questioning. A recent study on listening by Jean-Luc
Nancy brings into play a philosophical tradition, which, although Xenakis made only reference in passing (e.g.
the aforementioned reference to Husserl), is found to be in contact with his thinking at various registers. The two
will be allowed to resonance, I hope, in the third part of this article, after I explore the notions of temporality in
Xenakis and of sense in Nancy, in the first two sections.
1  “Que reste-t-il de la musique une fois qu'on a enlevé le temps?'” (Xenakis, 1976, p. 211).
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2.  TEMPORALITY AND EXTERIORITY 
We can see the Xenakian theory of temporality from two alternative perspectives, which however are not
independent  and  overlap  in  several  ways:  in  the  early  phase  Xenakis  usually  demonstrated  it  in  terms  of
composition or analysis––in short, in terms of music's mathematical or discursive aspects; later, he would be
more concerned with the perception of temporality in listening––a sort of phenomenological approach (although
in the early texts he also offered a psychological point of view, referencing Jean Piaget; see Xenakis, 1992, p.
160 & Varga, 196, p. 82). His thesis was that both musical composition and perception take place mainly outside
of time. We can locate the main originality of Xenakis'  thinking in this kind of  exteriority of  the temporal
experience: music takes place in the instantaneous present, but our experience takes place at the exterior of this
“present”, or as Nancy would say, at the external limit of this present. The mathematical perspective involves a
basic axiom and three categories of musical structure. “Time”, he said, “is nothing but a kind of structure. And
[therefore] it can be counted, expressed with real numbers, and shown as points on a straight line” (Varga, 1996,
pp. 82-3). The key to understanding his discovery is that time (like other aspects of sound), to the extent that it
can be expressed with numbers,  comprises  a  totally  ordered structure;  “ordered” here  means that  temporal
intervals can be added to each other, permuted, etc. (that is, they comprise an abelian group) without having to
use concepts of succession, such as “before” or “after”.2 Whenever we can do this, we are describing a structure
that is outside of time. From this fundamental discovery, Xenakis deduces three basic categories: a) outside of
time, b) temporal, and c) inside time.3 Whereas the inside-time structure is the actual composition, the outside-
time category refers to structures that remain independent of time; that is,  structures that do not necessitate
notions of causality in order to be described. As regards to the temporal category, Xenakis frequently made clear
that this is a much simpler category and that time (in music) is a “blank blackboard” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 173 &
Varga, 1996, p. 84) where structures or architectures are inscribed into (I will discuss this metaphor of writing
later on); in other words, the temporal category (or “algebra” as he would also say) serves only as a means of
rendering the music perceptible.4
2.1. Temporality, Dialectics, Ontology
The theory of  outside-time musical  structures  is  not  a theory among others.  In  a  sense,  all  of  Xenakis'
compositional tools (Stochastics, Sieve Theory, etc.) fall into the scope of his general view on composition that
is partly concerned with unveiling the nature of time in music. This is a theory that describes musical structures
in general, that includes his specialised theories, that refers equally to music perception and to analysis, and that
shows a general underlying abstract thinking. Therefore, it is a theory in an indirect sense, a  metatheory of
composition. As mentioned, Xenakis'  theories frequently took the form of a critique; although this aspect  is
beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that Xenakis points out a progressive “degradation of
outside-time structures of music since late medieval times” and this is “perhaps the most characteristic fact about
the evolution of Western European music” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 193). By advancing therefore the argument that
music  takes  place  mainly  outside  of  time,  Xenakis  challenged  traditional  preconceptions  and  attacked  the
mainstream avant-garde of his time.
From 1962 to 1969 Xenakis presented his classiﬁcation of musical structures in various texts, which look at
the temporal category from two alternative viewpoints: on the one hand, there is what we could call metric time
2 Bear in mind that “order” does not refer to ordering in time, but generally to any well-deﬁned arrangement of elements.  Xenakis defined ordered
structures as follows: “['Totally ordered structure' means that] given three elements of one set, you are able to put one of them in between the other two.
[…] Whenever you can do this with all the elements of the set, then this set, you can say, is an ordered set. It has a totally ordered structure because you can
arrange all the elements into a room full of the other elements. You can say that the set is higher in pitch, or later in time, or use some comparative
adjective: bigger, larger, smaller” (Zaplitny, 1975, p. 97). 
3  The term inside-time refers to Xenakis' in-time. 
4 This  is the period just  after  the completion of  Herma (1961)  where he ﬁrst  employed logical  functions, which later  led him to a more extensive
application of these operations and the development of his Sieve Theory. It could be said that,  following the stochastic works of the 1950s, Herma and
“Symbolic Music” mark the beginning of a new period in the evolution of Xenakis' thinking. It was at the beginning of that stage that Xenakis started to
introduce considerations that undermine the classical view of the importance of time in music.
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and on the other, causal time, which refers to the ordering of events, to how they succeed one another; moreover,
in some texts he presents three categories and in other occasions only two, outside- and inside-time. 5 In the
interest of economy, I will not explore the texts in detail, as it has been already argued that Xenakis essentially
conceived of two categories only, and that the temporal, from one text to another, collapses to either of the two
sides of his classification (see Exarchos, 2008, Chapters 1 & 2; cf. Solomos, 2004, p. 126). It will suffice to look
at this only briefly: in the tripartite classification of “Symbolic Music” (1963) the temporal category and the
outside-time one share the same algebra and their mapping constitutes a structure inside time (Xenakis, 1992, p.
160); whereas in “La voie de la recherche et de la question” of 1965, in a simple dichotomy,  the inside-time
nature is the direct result of the relation between the outside-time category  and  time as such, or “pure” time
(Xenakis, 1994, p. 68). This reveals that for Xenakis there seemed to be two different lines of thought when he
placed the temporal in relation to the other two categories; and this is shown by the fact that the middle category
is related to the other two in two different ways. On the one hand, time is (in a secondary sense) included in the
outside-time category as their corresponding algebras are identical; on the other, it is shown to be “rhythm in its
pure form”. The temporal structure takes different guises: from an entity that is simpler than the sonic event
itself, to pure inside-time music; or from metric time to time as rhythm in a much more general sense than metre.
But this is another phrasing for the dichotomy of outside/inside-time, of metric time and of pure time flow.
This dualistic but intricate thinking is summarised in Xenakis' final publication for this period, written in
1968, which talks about two categories but with a “triple correction”:
“There is a mental crystallisation around two categories: ontological, dialectical; Parmenides, Herac-
litus. Hence my typification of music, outside-time and temporal that lights so intensely. But with a
triple correction: 
a) in the outside-time, time is included, 
b) the temporal is reduced to the ordering, 
c) the ‘realisation', the ‘execution', that is the actualisation, is a play that makes a) and b) pass into the
instantaneous, the present which, being evanescent, does not exist. 
Being conscious, we have to destroy these liminal structures of time, space, logic… So with a new
mentality, with past, future and present interpenetrating, temporal but also spatial and logical ubiquity.
That's how immortality is. The omnipresent too… without flares, without medicine. With the mutation
of the categorising structures, thanks to the arts and sciences, in particular to music, obliged as she has
been recently to dive into these liminal regions” (Xenakis, 1969, p. 51).6
The outside-time category remains more important, whereas the inside-time is named as the instantaneous,
that  which does not exist.  In other words, Xenakis'  philosophy was in search of an ontology, rather than a
dialectics, or even a phenomenology proper; an ontology where tenses “interpenetrate”. This is why it would be
more  appropriate  to  talk  about  a  quasi-phenomenology  which  offers  the  possibility  for  Xenakis'  musical
ontology. (If anything, one should be cautious when one talks about music in terms that relate to the appearing of
phenomena.) This notion brings us closer to the later phase of his theory, to be developed mainly in the 1980s.
5 The tripartite  classiﬁcation appears  in “Symbolic Music” of 1963 (and its  predecessor “Trois pôles de condensation” of 1962) and in “Towards a
Metamusic” of 1967 (and its manuscript, “Harmoniques (Structures hors-temps)” of 1965); the simple dichotomy of outside/inside-time appears in “La
voie de la recherche et de la question” (1965) and “Towards a Philosophy of Music” (1966) (for original publication dates and reprints, see Solomos,
2001).
6 “Il y a une cristallisation mentale autour de deux catégories: ontologique, dialectique; Parménide, Héraclite. D'où ma typification de la musique, hors-
temps et temporelle qui s'éclaire ainsi intensément. Mais avec une correction triple:
a) dans le hors-temps est inclus le temps,
b) la temporelle est réduite à l'ordonnance,
c) la  « réalisation », l'  « exécution », c'est-à-dire l'actualisation, est un jeu qui  fait  passer a) et b) dans l'instantané, le  présent,  qui étant
évanescent, n'existe pas.
Il  faut,  étant  conscients,  détruire  ces  structure  liminaires  du  temps,  de  l'espace,  de  la  logique…Mental  donc  neuf,  passé  futur  présent
s'interpénétrant, ubiquités temporelle mais aussi spatiale et logique. Alors l'immortalité est. Le partout présent, aussi… sans fusées, sans médecine. Par la
mutation des structures catégorisantes, grâce aux sciences et aux arts, en particulier à la musique, obligée qu'elle a été de se plonger dans ces régions
liminaires récemment”. (My translation.)
3
2.2. Time, Space, Music
Moving on to the quasi-phenomenological approach, one of the key terms to understanding Xenakis' thinking
of temporality is that of separability, or discreetness. It is thanks to the fact that events are discreet that we are
able to perceive them in temporal (or other sort of) relations with each other and subsequently experience these
events as  members of an ordered structure.7 In a sense,  when we perceive sonic events we assign to them
temporal  intervals,  where the unit  is a kind of greatest  common divisor,  a common measure. 8 (This is why
Xenakis referred to a minimum of three events in his demonstration: we need at least two temporal intervals in
order to deduce a unit and compare them with each another.9) His formulation is as follows: the temporal events
we perceive, due to their separability, are assimilated to landmarks points, and thus leave their  trace in our
memory; we then assign distances between these traces and compare them; therefore, we have placed them
outside of time (Xenakis, 1992, p. 264-5).
In his essay, “Concerning Time, Space and Music”,10 time and space are considered inseparably interlinked;
he would say that time is not absolute, yet “it is always there” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 256). Time and space are not
simply commensurate, especially when they are not deﬁned simply as duration and as extension—and Xenakis
avoided this deﬁnition. He would refer to space as the appearance of “chains of energy transformations”, such as
the displacement, the movement of a photon, which in turn implies a certain temporality (Xenakis, 1992, p. 257).
A displacement in space is only reducible to transformation chains if we accept the notion of contiguity, that is
the state of being in direct contact. The linking of space and time (due to the relativity of time) allowed Xenakis
to pose the question of contiguity. “What would the pavement of the universe be if there were gaps between the
paving stones?” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 256). Although these points have no direct relation to music, they indicate
that Xenakis' thinking of time and space presupposes a certain materiality. Therefore, not only the notion of
separability, but also the notion of contiguity of matter, of direct contact, is an essential presupposition for the
temporal experience.
A ﬁnal key term in Xenakis'  exposition is that of  anteriority,  or succession. This concept, as opposed to
simultaneity, is interrogated by means of a thought experiment: “two chains of contiguous events without a
common link  can  be  indeﬁnitely  synchronous  or  anterior  in  relation  to  each  other;  [thereby]  time  is  […]
abolished in the temporal relation of each of the universes represented by the two chains” (Xenakis, 1992, p.
263).  We  see  therefore,  that  for  Xenakis,  on  the  one  hand  synchronisation  or  simultaneity abolishes  all
temporality between the two universes of events; on the other hand, contiguity and anteriority articulate, due to
separability, the “non-synchronization” of time. That is, the “removal of time” is the removal of anteriority, and
what remains is the simultaneity of all members of a mathematical set that has an ordered structure (such as a
scale, a sieve, etc.).
I hope that so far the themes of exteriority, separability, contiguity and the materiality these imply, as well as
the  notion  of  the  trace,  have  offered  a  general  overview  of  Xenakis'  complex  and  original  thinking  of
temporality.  Let  us  now  move  on  to  another  register,  where  the  same  themes  are  modulated  in  purely
philosophical terms; in particular,  Jean-Luc Nancy's philosophy with its preoccupation with listening and its
relation to 20th–century phenomenology. It is important to keep in mind that, as we will see, Nancy's philosophy
does not subscribe entirely to this tradition, although it draws heavily on it; in some ways, it is also a quasi-
phenomenology, as it does not focus on consciousness.
7 This is true for several aspects of the sonic event, such as pitch or duration, but obviously not for timbre (cf. Varga, 1996, p. 83).
8 Xenakis here would also point at Bertrand Russell saying (in his case, in relation to the axiomatics of numbers) that there is “no unitary displacement that
is either predetermined or related to an absolute size” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 195). 
9 “Three events are distinguished; the time intervals are distinguished; and independence between the sonic events and the time intervals is recognized. An
algebra outside-time is thus admitted for sonic events, and a secondary temporal algebra exists for temporal intervals; the two algebras are otherwise
identical” (Xenakis, 1992, p. 160).
10  In 1981 Xenakis published an article called “Le temps en musique”, which was extensively enlarged and published as “Sur le temps” in 1988. It then
appeared with additional material as chapter X in the revised edition of  Formalized Music in 1992, titled “Concerning Time, Space and Music” (see
Solomos, 2001).
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3. SENSE AND EXPERIENCE
Jean-Luc Nancy's  philosophy is  associated with the phenomenological  tradition of Edmund Husserl  and
Martin  Heidegger,  to  the  extent  that  it  deals  with  materiality,  body  and space.  For  both  philosophers,  the
spatiality of phenomenology can never be separated from the temporal nature of experience. Husserl used the
term  kinesthetic to  emphasise  the  importance  of  movement  in  perception  and of  temporal  intentionality  in
conscious experience;  in this sense,  moments of sensation always incorporate past  and future elements in a
movement of retention and anticipation (or protention, as he called it) (see James, 2006, p. 78). Moving away
from the isolation of pure consciousness,  allowed by Husserl's  phenomenological  reduction,  Heidegger  was
more interested in perception as the purposeful involvement in the concrete world. For him, the structure of
temporality is “ecstatic”, in the etymological sense of “standing outside of”; that is, spatiality is not an entity, but
an event of disclosure (see James, 2006, p. 84). These notions imply that experience is an exteriority, a standing
outside of itself or “ek-stasis”; and that the spatiality of experience depends also on a temporality, incorporating
a past and a future in order to constitute a present.
Nancy's take on those issues is at very close proximity with phenomenology, but properly speaking, he does
not put forward a phenomenological account. If from Husserl to Heidegger there is a transposition from the
internal sphere of experience to that of the world and of the being-there, in Nancy we ﬁnd a thematic modulation
to the domain of sense. The phenomenology that Nancy inherited (and their point of contact) insists on the
pragmatic, physical engagement with the world. The crucial difference, in summary, is that where Heidegger
spoke of space as a context of signiﬁcations, or  a system of relations, Nancy's thinking relies on the notion of
sense, a word that incorporates both sensibility and meaning. Sense, as the sensible and the intelligible, is not
material  in itself,  but presupposes a materiality,  and this allows for the formulation of a materialist,  bodily
ontology. In short, it is not that the world makes sense, but it exists as sense, prior to the existence of language,
but at the same time beyond all signiﬁcation. So, radicalising Heidegger's argument (who reserved for language
and signiﬁcance a fundamental role in his ontology) for Nancy there is always an ungraspable excess of sense (of
the world which is always already constituted as sense); from this follows a decisive break with phenomenology,
as consciousness is no longer the focal point.
The excess of sense that Nancy is thinking implicates the relationship between experience, signiﬁcation and
materiality. Before looking at this more closely, one could possibly think Xenakis' categories in the above terms.
The  domain  outside of time, is where signiﬁcation occurs, whereas inside time music is experienced in all its
materiality, placed in the instantaneous present as an event of disclosure. Intelligibility is gained by the placing
of rhythm outside of time; that is, by the musical experience which involves an engagement with both past and
future moments. In other words, a provisional, first reading would indicate a schema of correspondence between
the outside of time as the intelligible and the inside-time as the sensible.  However  this would be too hasty: it
would ignore the movement of sense, the temporality of engagement in listening, and would eventually result in
a traditional metaphysical dichotomy.
3.1. Exteriority, Limit, Touch
It is precisely the materiality and the simultaneous excessiveness of sense that allow Nancy to go beyond the
dichotomy of transcendence and immanence in relation to consciousness, and to use corporeal terms: touching,
contact, spacing, separation, all imply a certain exteriority and an impenetrable concreteness, therefore, a limit.
Nancy takes sense as an active engagement with the concrete world. The materiality of the latter essentially
implies an impenetrability, which brings again into play the notion of exteriority, and more precisely, of the
external limit. The active nature of sense implies that what senses is a body and that sensing is always related to
a temporality. Therefore, the primary sense for him is that  of touch:  of  palpating on the external border of
impenetrable matter.11 The corporeal takes place at the limit of sense, at the external border: thus, bodies, as
bodies of sense (that is, not as objects of discourse or of science), “take place neither in discourse nor in matter.
11  “It is not a matter of signiﬁcation, but of the sense of the world as its very concreteness, that on which our existence touches and by which it is touched,
in all possible senses” (Nancy, 1997, p. 10).
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They inhabit neither ‘the mind' nor ‘the body'. They take place at the limit,  as the limit” (Nancy, 2008, p. 18).
The movement of sense takes place according to an intricate interrelation with matter and with signiﬁcation; in
his classic Being Singular Plural Nancy points out a subtle but important difference: “Either as an audible voice
or a visible mark, saying is corporeal, but what is said is incorporeal. […] Language is not in the world or inside
the world, as though the world were its body: it is the outside of the world in the world” (Nancy, 2000, p. 84).
Bodies touch on matter (as impenetrable concreteness), while sense (as the bodily event) exists on the outer limit
of language, although simultaneously being the site where language can occur. The mode of this interrelation is
touch and separation,  and  not  continuity  or  mediation.  Touch,  in  this  sense,  is  not  the  mediation,  but  the
condition  for  perceiving  the  world,  which  is  impenetrable  but  palpable;  touch is  therefore  primarily  about
impenetrability and less about proximity.
3.2. Materiality, Meaning, Sound
Materiality, sense, meaning, limit; these terms are central in all of Nancy's philosophy, but do not appear in
the form of one complete account. Rather, they are dispersed in several of his works, including his recent text on
Listening.12 Sound is taken to be sonorous materiality, and for Nancy the general question is whether sound and
meaning might share a space, and what kind of space might that be. In order to be able to see the formulation he
achieves, it is helpful to keep in mind the relation between sense, materiality and signiﬁcation—and their touch
at the limit. The contact of sound (“that is musically listened to”) with signiﬁcation, Nancy says, takes place at
the sharing of the referral; meaning is made up of references (from sign to thing, and so on), whereas sound,
spreads in space as resonance, in a sounding that is always already a re-sounding:
“One can say […] at least, that meaning and sound share the space of a referral, in which at the same
time they refer to each other, and that, in a very general way, this space can be deﬁned as the space of a
self, a subject. A self is nothing other than a form or function of referral: a self is made of relationship
to self, or of a presence to self, which is nothing other than the mutual referral between a perceptible
individuation and an intelligible identity” (Nancy, 2007, p. 9). 
By sonorous materiality here we must think of the vibration that animates the auditory body; the function of
the referral is found in the reverberation, its opening up to the resonant body and its vibration, its self-reference.
Nancy would go on to relate sound, meaning and temporality: “music […] anticipates its arrival and remembers
its departure, itself remaining suspended and straining between the two: time and sonority, sonority as time and
as meaning” (Nancy,  2007,  p.  20). Resounding and language share  the referral  in the spacing between the
sounded and re-sounded, the said and re-said. Signiﬁcation, as a system of references, is the spacing of the
referral: “Every spoken word is the simultaneity of at least two different modes of that spoken word; even when
I am by myself, there is the one that is said and the one that is heard, that is, the one that is resaid” (Nancy, 2000,
p. 86). Another key word for this is that of echo: its rhythmic self-referral is the condition of sonority but also the
condition of signiﬁcation (or the condition of sense). Sense, as the touch at the limit of matter, and as the beyond
of signiﬁcation, is “ﬁrst of all the rebound of sound”, which, moving away from signiﬁcation, “consists […] in a
listening, where only resonance comes to resound” (Nancy, 2007, p. 30).
3.3. Exscription
The formulation I am putting forward here is useful for us, in order to think Xenakis' approach to time, timbre
and rhythm. In particular, the interconnection of sound as sonorous materiality with language as signiﬁcation,
can help concentrate  on the importance of  sense in  understanding  Xenakis'  formulation.  Writing (including
mathematic signiﬁcation) has been used extensively by Xenakis as a metaphor in relation to time, either directly
or indirectly, when he suggested the trace as point of reference. Although he did not interrogate the function of
writing as such, we must take this term as suggested by Jacques Derrida (who has influenced Nancy greatly). For
12 À l'écoute (Paris: Galilée, 2002) is an adaption of “Être à l'écoute,” in L'écoute, ed. Peter Szendy, 275-315 (Paris: IRCAM; and Montreal: L'Harmattan,
2000). For the English edition of  Listening,  translated by Charlotte Mandell  (New York,  Fordham University Press,  2007),  Nancy has included two
additional texts: “March in Spirit in Our Ranks” and “How Music Listens to Itself”.
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Derrida, the term writing suggests an originary rupture of all identity, a foundation with no foundation, so to
speak, in a process of inscribing and effacing of signifying traces; or, as Spivak puts it, it is “the structure always
already inhabited by the trace” (Derrida, 1997, p. xxxix). Writing is important for Nancy in relation to techne, as
the interconnection of sense and material bodies; that is, not so much as the iteration of traces, but as the touch-
separation of impenetrable matter and sense (or bodies as sense) (see James, 2006, pp. 147-8). At the same time,
sense, although it provides the context for signiﬁcation, it is a bodily event that is outside of signiﬁcation. In
order to account for this exteriority in relation to inscription, Nancy uses the term exscription; as Ian James puts
it, “exscription […] describes the relation of exteriority, or separation which is maintained between impenetrable
matter and bodily sense, and between bodily sense and linguistic signiﬁcation” (James, 2006, p. 149). Or in
Nancy's words, “writing takes its place at the limit. So if anything at all happens to writing, nothing happens to it
but touch. More precisely: touching the body (or some singular body) with the incorporeality of 'sense'” (Nancy,
2008, p. 11). The notions of exteriority and the limit have interesting implications in relation to Xenakis' own
thought:  the “liminal  regions” of  “time,  space and logic” have to  be overcome in the search of  a  musical
ontology, where music does not belong to the instantaneous present any longer. In this sense, exscription can be
thought  as  the  process  whereby  temporal  structures  are  being  placed  outside  of  time.  These  repercussions
between Xenakis' and Nancy's thinking relate as much to their conception of space-time as to their take on the
nature of listening.
4. CONTEMPORARY TIME
The question of contiguity, of direct contact, was posed by Xenakis in light of the discovery of the relativity
of time. The proposals of a possible quantic structure of time, allowed Xenakis to take the question further:
“what could a quantiﬁed time and space signify, a time and space in which contiguity would be abolished?”
(Xenakis, 1992, p. 256). The two chains in the aforementioned experiment have no common link and there is no
mediation between the two. This immediacy is for Nancy not “an absence of exteriority. On the contrary,” he
says “it is the instantaneous exteriority of space-time (the instant itself as exteriority: the simultaneous)” (Nancy,
2000, p. 68). We see therefore, that for Xenakis, on the one hand synchronisation or simultaneity abolishes all
temporality between the two universes of events; on the other hand, contiguity and anteriority articulate, in a
sense, the “non-synchronization” of time. 
Thus, time-space as perceived by Xenakis is experienced as the spatio-temporal linking of simultaneity and
anteriority. The latter accounts for temporality in the context of a singular instance of Xenakis' chain of events.
In the plural, in the simultaneous plural, the absence of anteriority between the two chains is (in the example
given, but in any case, potentially) the condition for what Nancy would call contemporary time. The linking of
time and space that Xenakis locates early in his exposition, appears more decisive in Nancy's formulation as the
spacing  of  time;  more  precisely,  he  says  that  “time  cannot  be  the  pure  [instant],  or  pure  succession”  (or
anteriority, in Xenakis' terms), “without being simultaneity 'at the same time'. Time itself implies 'at the same
time'. Simultaneity immediately opens up space as the spacing of time itself” (Nancy, 2000, p. 61).
For Xenakis then, time in music is seized only indirectly,  due to its non-synchronization with reference-
events, whose disappearing leave traces in our memory. The trace thus takes the place of one of the two chains of
contiguous events. In turn, the condition of trace (and therefore of temporal experience) is the contiguity of
events, and their discreetness. It is the notion of separability that enables signiﬁcation, in the form of the trace,
and therefore renders a palpable sense to the temporal ﬂux; in Xenakis'  own words, “separation, bypassing,
difference, discontinuity, which are strongly interrelated, are prerequisite to the notion of anteriority” (Xenakis,
1992, p. 262). The same themes recur here, the themes we ﬁnd in Nancy's formulation in relation to touch, as the
sense which implies  discreetness,  exteriority,  materiality,  and impenetrability.  It  is  also interesting here  that
Xenakis thinks of the trace as the function that allows the interpenetration of the tenses: “in music, when you are
composing or listening, part of the past engages you in the future” (Harley, 2002, p. 13). In a way, this echoes
Husserl's  account  of  retention and protention,  the temporality  of  the phenomenological  experience,  and  the
Heideggerian  exteriority  of  this  temporality.  A more  detailed  account  is  given  by  Xenakis'  aforementioned
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axiomatization: the landmark points, their trace in our memory, are “instantaneously hauled up outside of time”
(Xenakis, 1992, p. 264). We see that the second chain of events is none other than the trace of the events of ﬁrst;
that this other chain of events is hauled up outside of time by retentions and protentions, and that were it not for
such a kind of engagement, time would collapse to unitary, absolute interiority; we see that, as Nancy would
have it, every sonic event is the simultaneity of at least two different modes of that event, and the exteriority of
such an experience, the exteriority of the materiality of sound and the exteriority of writing, exists in the mode of
touch and of exscription: in a sense, the writing-outside of time.
This thinking provides a slight complication in Xenakis' formulation: temporal events exist  simultaneously
with their own trace, in a spacing of time that takes place due to the excess of sense––of listening as touch.
Nancy has shown that what enables the spacing of the function of referring in language, is the simultaneity of the
said and re-said, and in music, of the sounded and the re-sounded. In Xenakis' terms, the concept of simultaneity
stands  for  what  remains—as  a  trace—once  time  has  been  removed.  But,  according  to  Nancy's  notion  of
contemporary time, simultaneity is a necessary implication of the spacing of time. Therefore, the outside-time
aspect of music is a necessary implication in any musical system or technique, but also always already at work in
musical experience as such. The relationship, on the one hand, between listening and meaning and on the other,
between listening and sound is intricate precisely because of the excess of sense that Nancy takes as his axiom:
listening is both the condition and the beyond of signiﬁcation. Listening, as the musical sense, consists in a
movement, or a tension that takes place on the limits of sonorous matter and of linguistic signiﬁcation; but only
on the condition that, as sense, it exceeds all signiﬁcation, while at the same time it provides the context for it.
The excess of the sense of listening therefore is responsible for the extra-temporal experience of music, that is,
for placing rhythm outside of time, but also for the experience of the materiality of musical sound itself.
It is possible then to think of Xenakis' temporal category as the site of touch on the limit, on the one hand,
between sense and sonorous materiality (the inside of time as it were), and on the other, between bodily sense
and linguistic signiﬁcation, with its traces, its assigning of intervals, its exscription (that is, its placing outside of
time). Xenakis proposed Sieve Theory as a response to articulating the outside of time and as a method for the
articulation of  timbre.  But  this  was not  destined to provide complete  solutions;  for instance,  in  relation  to
electroacoustic music Sieve Theory remained an unﬁnished project. However, Xenakis' increasing preoccupation
with timbre (in sound synthesis, but also in his acoustic compositions with the slowing down of tempo) indicates
that  for him sonorous materiality remained central in the quest for a palpable sense of music.  Many of his
theories were applied only in a fragmentary way; his music too, was never in search of totalizing answers––it
became more and more fragmented itself (even up to his very late works, with no beginning, nor end articulated
as  such).  He remained an “artist-artisan”,  engaged in the process  of  constructing concrete  works,  be  it  the
musical concrete or the architectonic.
As such, as an artist of the concrete, Xenakis exposed the conditions of listening to an impenetrable sonorous
concreteness. As I have argued, what both Xenakis and Nancy sought after is an ontology of sound that does not
focus on language or consciousness; in this process, phenomenological considerations are means to an end. For
Nancy, this end means to envisage sense as a resonance beyond signification; body as a resonant space; and
subjectivity as the self that is listening to the beyond-meaning (see Nancy, 2007, p. 31). If the self is nothing
other than a function of referral, and if resonance is nothing but the timbre and reverberation of sound, Xenakis
sensed that to listen entails an ek-static subject; a listener, an artist, a self, outside of time, exposed to the world,
but also gaining access to it, through a music that, as it were, never stops listening to itself. A music that “never
stops exposing the present to the imminence of a deferred presence, one that is more 'to come' [à venir] than any
'future' [avenir]. A presence that is not future, but merely promised, merely present because of its announcement,
its  prophecy in  the instant.  Prophecy in the  instant  and  of  the  instant:  announcement  in  that  instant  of  its
destination outside of time, in an eternity” (Nancy, 2007, p. 66). Perhaps Xenakis' prophecy will prove to be a
thinking across the boundaries of science and the arts, of a passage of sense which is neither transcendent nor
immanent, but which exposes a world that is created, incessantly, as techne, as an incessant auto-creation. Music,
in its capacity to engage thinking, listening, touching, was for Xenakis a hope for gaining access to the world, to
the unheard-of, to the beyond signiﬁcation; in short, a hope for an inexhaustible resonance.
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